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Abstract
This paper provides an economic framework to analyze the relation-
ship between nationalistic sentiments and international trade. Nation-
alistic sentiments respond to economic interests, and in particular they
vary according to the relative importance of the domestic market to lo-
cal economies. Nationalistic sentiments are weaker (stronger) where the
local economy relies more on exports (domestic sales). Our paper tests
this theory using a unique dataset collected across 218 Chinese cities. We
document a negative association between nationalistic sentiments and de-
pendence on exports, conditional on a wide range of city characteristics
including political ideologies of residents and local business climate.
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It is not easy to see how the more extreme forms of nationalism can
long survive when men have seen the Earth in its true perspective as
a single small globe against the stars. (Arthur C. Clarke, 1917–2008,
British science fiction author, inventor, and futurist)
[T]he economical advantages of commerce are surpassed in impor-
tance by those of its effects, which are intellectual and moral. It is
hardly possible to overrate the value, in the present low state of hu-
man improvement, of placing human beings in contact with persons
dissimilar to themselves, and with modes of thought and action unlike
those with which they are familiar. (John Stuart Mill, 1806–1873,
British philosopher, economist and civil servant)
1 Introduction
Nationalistic sentiments are very influential in shaping politics across time and
in all places. Their impacts are evident in wide-ranging political events, from
the destruction of the Ottoman Empire to the collapse of the Soviet Union, from
the Buy American Recovery Act to the contemporary euro crisis. Nationalistic
sentiments are known to stem from history, ethnicity, ideology, and geopolitics.
In this paper, we ask how nationalistic sentiments respond to economic interests
that result from trade. Since the process of globalization is accompanied with
the increase in trade volume, understanding the relationship between trade and
nationalistic sentiments will predict the future of nationalistic sentiments in the
world.
In this paper, we analyze domestic regional economies in a single country,
with their respective products supplying each other (the home market) and the
foreign countries (the foreign market). If isolated from the foreign market, these
regions in the home autarky will have the strongest nationalistic sentiments, be-
cause the home market is the only market on which everybody relies to live and
prosper. If this country is open to trade, regions will develop different levels of
nationalistic sentiments, depending on the relative importance of domestic sales
and exports with respect to their local economies. Regions with a lower ratio of
exports to gross domestic product (GDP) will have stronger nationalistic sen-
timents. Exports weaken the sentiments by reducing common interests shared
with the domestic market and raising the common interests with the foreign
market.
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We then submit the negative association between nationalistic sentiments
and exports to empirical tests. We use a unique dataset collected by the web-
site Zuobiao, a website in China that follows the prototype of the UK website
Political Compass to provide an anonymous test for visitors to assess their po-
litical stances.1 In 2009, the Zuobiao website recorded answers given by 54,613
test participants from 239 cities in mainland China.2 Using their questions
and answers related to nationalistic sentiments, we construct a city-level in-
dex of nationalistic sentiments in China. An important merit of this dataset
is the truth-telling incentive it provides to respondents. The sole purpose for
respondents electing to take the 50-question Zuobiao test is to have their po-
litical stances assessed; thus, respondents would not benefit from concealing or
altering their political beliefs.3
We find that at the city level the share of exports in local GDP is nega-
tively associated with nationalistic sentiments. Quantitatively, a one standard
deviation increase in exports/GDP is associated with a decrease in nationalistic
sentiments by approximately 0.2 standard deviations. This finding is condi-
tional on a wide range of city characteristics (e.g., demographics), especially the
ratio of imports to local GDP. Specifically, imports/GDP and exports/GDP are
each negatively associated with nationalistic sentiments; but when exports and
imports are both included in a regression, the association between nationalis-
tic sentiments and exports/GDP remains, whereas that between nationalistic
sentiments and imports/GDP disappears. This is consistent with our theory:
exports and imports both vary by local trade costs, while only exports are
driven by local comparative advantage. When exports and imports are both
included in the regression, only the association between nationalistic sentiments
and the exports induced by comparative advantage is identified. This is further
corroborated by a negative correlation that we find between net exports and
nationalistic sentiments.
Our empirical study aims to document the association between exports and
nationalistic sentiments rather than the causal effect of the former on the latter,
1Their web addresses are, respectively, http://www.zuobiao.me and
http://www.politicalcompass.org.
2Here, cities refer to prefecture-level cities (equivalently, four-digit area codes). In China,
a prefecture is composed of an urban center and surrounding rural areas that are larger than
the urban center.
3This feature thereby addresses the response bias that usually distresses self-report data;
namely, individuals may hide their true attitudes in order to avoid presenting a negative image
to data collectors. For a discussion on response bias in the statistics literature, see Bollinger
and David (1997).
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since exports are not randomly assigned. To ascertain that the association is in-
deed between these two variables, we have examined various other channels that
may cause a correlation between exports and nationalistic sentiments. First, we
look into the self-selection of individual test participants. Internet accessibil-
ity may impact the types of individuals who participate, thereby affecting the
nationalistic sentiments that are recorded. We find that internet accessibility
is positively correlated with local income level, but not with local nationalis-
tic sentiments. Furthermore, we investigate the likelihood of visiting Zuobiao
in local residents, which also turns out to be uncorrelated with nationalistic
sentiments.
Second, we take into account heterogeneity in political ideologies across
cities, which may not have been reflected in the city characteristics. We find
that the correlation between exports and nationalistic sentiments decreases only
slightly in response to including protectionist attitudes; further, city-level ex-
ports hold little explanatory power in accounting for political conservatism,
adherence to traditions, or opinions toward market-oriented economic reforms,
in contrast to its strong power in explaining nationalistic sentiments. This in-
dicates that our results are unlikely to be driven by unobservable heterogeneity
in local ideologies.
Third, we take business climate into account. It is possible that the associ-
ation between exports and nationalistic sentiments reflects the fact that foreign
importers feel more comfortable conducting business in cities with weaker na-
tionalistic sentiments. To address this possibility, we check whether forthcom-
ing foreign direct investment (FDI) varies according to nationalistic sentiments
across cities. The forthcoming FDI is measured by the number and value of FDI
contracts signed after foreign investors finish a comprehensive review of busi-
ness climates in Chinese cities. Because the forthcoming FDI has not actually
occurred yet, it therefore does not affect current nationalistic sentiments. No
significant association between forthcoming FDI and nationalistic sentiments
is detected, suggesting that (lack of) nationalistic sentiments do not generate
relative threats (favors) to foreign commerce.
Last, we use data collected by the well-known World Value Survey (WVS)
to rerun our empirical study. The two recent waves of the WVS, conducted in
2001 and 2007, occurred respectively before and after China’s accession into the
World Trade Organization (WTO). China’s exports and imports increased by
almost 70% in the six years between the two waves. Using this quasi-exogenous
shock in trade, we arrive at the same findings as those obtained using the Zuo-
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biao data.
Our paper contributes to the literature by building an economic framework
of understanding nationalistic sentiments. Nationalistic sentiments, although
important in politics, have been largely neglected by economists and other so-
cial scientists. There is not an analytical framework that can address funda-
mental questions about nationalistic sentiments, such as how they come into
being, whether they are rational, and what determine their levels. The existing
literature, mostly in political science, concentrates on simply describing nation-
alistic sentiments in different countries and times.4 Similar to other economic
studies, our paper proposes a theory that is based on homo economicus, uses
the minimal number of concepts, and derives findings from a few straightfor-
ward assumptions. Our framework analyzes the level of nationalistic sentiments
within a single country. In this context, nationalistic sentiments vary according
to domestic and foreign trade, which align the interests of regional economies
with domestic and foreign markets, respectively. Nationalistic sentiments are
rational and vary in response to the relative importance of domestic and foreign
markets to local income and jobs.
This paper focuses on within-country nationalistic sentiments. However, we
are aware that cross-country nationalistic sentiments are affected by history,
ethnicity, ideology, and geopolitics. These parameters have received increasing
attention in the economics literature. Take the trade literature for example.
Using cross-country data, Acemoglu and Yared (2010) find that nationalism and
militarism are negatively associated with trade. Trade has also been found to be
related with institutions (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2005), insecurity
(Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002), and wars (Blomberg and Hess, 2006; Findlay
and O’Rourke, 2007; Glick and Taylor, 2005; Martin, Mary, and Thoenig, 2008,
2010; Skaperdas and Syropoulos, 2001). Our paper adds the economics of trade
and nationalistic sentiments to this body of the literature.
Our paper is also related to two other branches of the economic literature.
The first branch studies how country boundaries are endogenously determined
by democratization and wars (Alesina and Spolaore, 1997, 2005). Our paper
takes their (physical) country boundary as given and analyzes how nationalis-
tic sentiments, as a “mental” country boundary, are endogenously determined.
The two boundaries are complementary. The physical boundary of a coun-
try resulting from political events and wars pinpoints the political identity of
4See Ozkirimli (2010) and Mearsheimer (2011) for surveys on these theories.
4
its nationals, who may perceive that identity in different ways due to their
own economic interests, leading to different levels of nationalistic sentiments.
The second branch involves the determinants of protectionist attitudes (Bloni-
gen, 2010; Mayda and Rodrik, 2005; O’Rourke and Sinnott, 2001; Scheve and
Slaughter, 2001). These empirical studies test how protectionist attitudes vary
by occupations and human capital. Similar to these studies, we consider po-
litical attitudes as a representation of economic interests. Unlike these studies,
however, we do not study attitudes toward foreign products, but rather the
attitudes toward foreign countries caused by the trade of domestic and foreign
products. This is an important distinction, since nationals in a country may
dislike the imported foreign products that threaten their interests, but like the
foreign countries because other imported foreign products improve their lives
and moreover foreign countries buy their local products.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 builds a model of
common interests that connect nationalistic sentiments with trade. Section 3
describes the data used in our empirical study. Section 4 reports the empirical
results. Section 5 concludes.
2 A Model of Common Interests
This section analyzes nationalistic sentiments by showing how economic interests
in a regional economy relate to foreign countries. Products of a regional economy
serve domestic and foreign markets, and meanwhile consumption goods are from
these two markets. Nationalistic sentiments reflect how a given regional economy
relies on its domestic market; in other words, exports decrease local reliance on
the domestic market and increase that on the foreign market. Therefore, the
variation in nationalistic sentiments translates into common interests shared by
a regional economy with one market relative to the other.
Consider a world with two countries, i = H or F , each of which has a
continuum of cities. Each city in the world makes one variety;5 for convenience,
let varieties and cities share the same index j, and country name and set of
varieties share the same label H or F . All residents in the world have a love-of-
5This is the Armington assumption literature widely used in the trade literature; see, e.g.,
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003).
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variety (Dixit-Stiglitz) preference. For city j, the utility function is
Uj =
[ˆ
j′
xj(j′)αdj′
]1/α
, j, j′ ∈ H ∪ F, (1)
where xj(j′) is the quantity of variety j′ (i.e., made in city j′) consumed in city
j, σ ≡ 1/(1− α) is the constant elasticity of substitution among varieties.
The demand for variety j′ in city j is
xj(j′) =
[τj(j′)p(j′)]−σ
P 1−σj
Ej , (2)
where τj(j′)p(j′) is the delivery price of variety j′ in city j,
Pj ≡
[ˆ
j′∈H
p(j′)1−σdj′ +
ˆ
j′∈F
τj(j′)1−σp(j′)1−σdj′
]1/(1−σ)
(3)
is the price level in city j, and Ej is the total expenditure in city j. The delivery
price has two components, an iceberg trade cost τj(j′) and the producer price
p(j′). The cost of within-country trade is zero; the cost of trade across countries
depends on the source and destination cities. For simplicity, we assume that
country F has a focal port such that exports from all cities of country H to
country F end up at that port and then enter into costless trade within country
F . Thus, for city j in country H,
τj(j′) = τj′(j) =
 1,τj > 1,
if
if
j′ ∈ H
j′ ∈ F.
(4)
Producer prices are determined by exogenous extended comparative advan-
tage. A lower p(j) is an extended comparative advantage of city j in production.
Recall that by assumption cities make only their unique varieties; underlying
this assumption is a cost advantage for each city in making its own variety. The
lower p(j) signifies a further (i.e., extended) cost advantage in making city j’s
variety. Say, cities j and k are the best in making varieties j and k, respectively.
If p(j) < p(k), city j is better in making its own variety j than city k in making
its own variety k.
The production of all varieties is constant return to scale, and uses labor as
the only input. Therefore, the wage rate in a city is equal to the price of the
variety that the city produces. Each city has one unit of labor (i.e., residents),
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which is inelastically supplied to the production of its variety. Not all the labor
can be employed in the variety-production sector, the employment of which is
Lj < 1; thus, Lj is also the probability for city-j residents to be employed in the
variety-production sector. The rest of the labor is employed in an informal sector
that pays a lower wage than the variety-production sector, and we normalize
this informal wage to be zero. Labor cannot migrate across cities or countries.6
The total income, or equivalently gross domestic product (GDP), of city j
is
wjLj =
p(j)1−σ
P 1−σH
EH +
τ(j)1−σp(j)1−σ
P 1−σF
EF , (5)
where
P 1−σi =
ˆ
j′∈i
p(j′)1−σdj′ +
ˆ
j∈i,j′∈−i
[τj(j′)p(j′)]1−σdj′ (6)
and Ei =
´
j′∈i wj′Lj′dj
′. The second term on the right side of equation (5) is
city j’s total exports (in value),7 denoted by EXPj .8
The welfare in city j is measured by its real income wjLj/Pj , or equivalently,
Ej/Pj . From city j’s perspective, its welfare is affected by the foreign country
F through two parameters, foreign expenditure EF and price level of foreign
goods P ∗Fj ≡
´
j′∈F [τjp(j
′)]1−σdj′. Notably, P ∗Fj is not PF but the trade-cost
adjusted component of PF corresponding to country F goods; it is essentially´
j′∈F p(j
′)1−σdj′, or P ∗F conditional on τj , because τj is specific to the importing
city j.
The common interests shared by city j with country F are represented by
the connection between wjLj and EF through exports, as well as the connection
between Pj and P ∗Fj through imports. We start with the export side. wjLj is
connected to EF through equation (5).9 Define the exports/GDP share to be
6Migration across cities within a country can be easily added to the model. In that case,
all domestic cities are grouped into a nation-wide city. In that case, we should consider a
world of multiple countries, where our city-level findings still hold, simply with the term city
replaced by country (i.e., nation-wide city).
7The share of each city in the continuum of cities is zero; therefore, the demand for a domes-
tic variety in all domestic cities conditional on its price can be approximated by total domestic
expenditure over price level in the country PH , or
´
j′∈H wj′Lj′/P
1−σ
j′ dj
′ ' EH/P 1−σH .
8In this paper, exports and imports refer only to cross-country trade.
9wjLj is the expected wage of all residents in city j, including those in the informal sector,
such that wjLj also represents the welfare of those in the informal sector.
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EXj ≡ EXPj/GDPj . The elasticity of wjLj with respect to EF is10
d lnwjLj
d lnEF
= τ(j)
1−σp(j)1−σEF
wjLjP
1−σ
F
= EXj ; (7)
thus, we have
Proposition 1. Among cities in country H, those with high exports/GDP ratios
(EX) share more common interests with the foreign country F resulting from
exports.
Proposition 1 is the central prediction in this paper, and the reasoning behind
it can be further illustrated with the following example. Consider a negative
shock that reduces EF . Residents in city j would incur a welfare loss together
with country F , and the welfare loss of city j will be larger if it has been more
intensively exporting to country F .
Next we move on to the import side. First, the total imports of city j is
IMPj =
ˆ
j′∈F
[τjp(j′)]1−σ
P 1−σj
Ejdj
′,
where Ej = wjLj in equilibrium. Similar to EXj , the share of imports of city j
in its local expenditure (i.e., GDP) is denoted by IMj ≡ IMPj/GDPj . Thus,
IMj =
ˆ
j′∈F
[τjp(j′)]1−σ
P 1−σj Ej
Ejdj
′ =
ˆ
j′∈F
[τjp(j′)]1−σ
P 1−σj
dj′.
By equation (3), the elasticity of Pj with respect to P ∗Fj is equal to the share of
imported goods in city j’s expenditure:
lnPj
lnP ∗Fj
= IMj ; (8)
thus, we have
Proposition 2. Among cities in country H, those with high imports/GDP
ratios (IM) share more common interests with the foreign country F resulting
from imports.
Propositions 1–2 present the relationship between the variations in trade
(EX and IM) and the variation in common interests shared with the foreign
10We do not consider the case that foreign income affects city j through affecting other
cities in the home country, which is essentially a multiplier effect.
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country. We now examine the source of variations in EX and IM . Comparing
EX and IM of two cities j and k in country H, τj 6= τk, we obtain
EXj
EXk
=
(
τj
τk
)1−σ (
p(j)
p(k)
)1−σ
, (9)
and
IMj
IMk
=
(
τj
τk
)1−σ
. (10)
Equations (9) and (10) demonstrate that a higher EX could result from either
a lower trade cost or a lower price of the city’s variety, while a higher IM is
only due to a lower trade cost. Put differently, a low τj raises the common
interests shared by city j with country F , but one cannot tell whether it is
exports or imports that lead to the increase in common interests. In contrast, a
low p(j) also raises the common interests shared by city j with country F , and
the channel can only be exports. In summary,
Proposition 3. The common interests resulting from imports cannot be sepa-
rated from those resulting from exports; but the common interests resulting from
exports can be separated from those resulting from imports.
Proposition 3 points out a key identification issue when one estimates the asso-
ciation between common interests and exports. Larger exports can result from
either comparative advantage in production (lower p(j)) or trade cost advan-
tage (low τj); only the former is specific to exports and thus identified by the
association between common interests and exports.
Trade cost in the trade literature refers to tariff rate and transport cost.
Tariff rate in our context is held constant because the same tariff rate applies
to all domestic cities. Transport cost in our context is broadly defined, which
includes all factors that discourage trade and meet conditions (a) city-specific
and (b) independent from local comparative advantage in production. Transport
cost satisfies (a) and (b), while numerous other factors potentially and arguably
do. Then how to control for trade cost? A solution stands out from equations
(9) and (10): to use EX − IM , namely net exports/GDP, to pin down the
comparative-advantage induced common interests.11
The above model is deliberately kept simple—in a word, trade generates
common interests that regional economies share with the foreign market, which
11We do not use EX/IM because very small values of IM cause extremely large values of
the ratio, and the ratio also magnifies measurement errors in both EX and IM .
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reduce the common interests that regional economies share with the domestic
market, and lead to a negative association between nationalistic sentiments and
trade. Propositions 1–3, can be transformed into three hypotheses:
I. A negative correlation between nationalistic sentiments and either EX or
IM . This negative association could be through either exports (induced
by comparative advantage and trade cost) or imports (induced by trade
cost).
II. A negative correlation between nationalistic sentiments and EX, condi-
tional on IM , but not vice versa. The negative association is through
exports (induced by comparative advantage). With EX controlled for,
the association between nationalistic sentiments and IM will disappear,
because the variation in trade cost has been absorbed by the negative
association between nationalistic sentiments and EX.
III. A negative association between nationalistic sentiments and EX − IM .
This negative association is through exports (induced by comparative ad-
vantage).
Hypothesis I illustrates the common interests built on trade but cannot specify
which form of trade, exports or imports, is causing the common interests. Hy-
pothesis II demonstrates exports as a channel of common interests. Hypothesis
III presents the comparative advantage induced exports as the channel of com-
mon interests. When submitted to testing, these hypotheses will be confounded
by a series of other factors as detailed in Section 4. For now, we move on to
describe the data that are used.
3 Data
3.1 Overview
Our data on nationalistic sentiments were obtained from the website Zuobiao,
a website that follows the prototype of the UK website Political Compass but
has test questions customized to the Chinese socio-economic context. A test
participant is asked to appraise 50 statements on a four-point scale (strongly
agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree). Her responses are then mapped by
the website using an algorithm into a coordinate in a three-dimensional refer-
ence system (authoritarianism vs. libertarianism, conservatism vs. liberalism,
10
collectivism vs. neoliberalism) to generate a test report. Appendix A1 provides
a sample test report on a participant’s quantitative political stance. A crucial
advantage of using test data is that tests provide participants with incentives
to reveal their true attitudes: they have to reply honestly in order to have their
stances evaluated.
Responses made on the Zuobiao test are strictly anonymous. Anonymity pro-
tects privacy and prevents test participants from the political risks associated
with expressing political attitudes. The website records the Internet Protocol
(IP) addresses of participants, which are not linkable to individual identities.12
Zuobiao further assures anonymity by not asking for demographic information,
including income, age or gender. This additional measure provides extra pro-
tection for participants, although it does create a data limitation that we will
discuss later.
Although demographic data are absent, we are able to determine the loca-
tions of the participants by mapping the IP addresses to Chinese prefecture-level
cities.13 Only IP addresses associated with mainland China are included in our
sample. Each IP address is counted as one participant. In the end, our sample
contains 54,613 participants. Our measure of individual nationalistic sentiments
is an index averaged from each person’s responses to the following four state-
ments:
[N1] Given sufficient comprehensive national power, China has the
right to take any measure to protect its interests.
[N2] Western countries, headed by the United States, will not really
allow China to become a world-class strong nation.
[N3] State unity and territorial integrity are the interests of paramount
priority for a society.
[N4] All students, regardless of whether they are in college, high
school, or elementary school, should attend the military training
arranged by the government.
12IP addresses in China are allocated to institutions rather than individuals, and quali-
fied institutions are mostly internet service providers. See “Administration of Record Filing
of Internet IP Addresses Procedures,” effective as of 20 March 2005. Its English transla-
tion can be found at http://www.chinalawedu.com/news/23223/23228/22159.htm. A de-
tailed list of China’s IP address allocations, including the total number of addresses and
shares of local internet service providers, can be found at http://news.xinhuanet.com/it/2006-
01/18/content_4067158.htm.
13See footnote 2 for the definition of prefecture.
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These four statements are concerned with four different aspects of nationalistic
sentiments: the supremacy of national interests, xenophobia, state sovereignty
and territorial integrity, and compulsory militarism. N4, in particular, addresses
the linkage between nationalism and militarism raised by Acemoglu and Yared
(2010). Response options provided by Zuobiao are “strongly agree,” “agree,”
“disagree,” and “strongly disagree,” respectively coded as 4, 3 , 2 and 1.14 Table
1 shows that responses to statements N1–N4 are positively correlated, though
any one of the four cannot absorb the information in the other three. This
points to the need to use an average of responses. As done in previous studies
(e.g., Charles and Guryan, 2008), the arithmetic mean of responses to these four
statements is used as the measure of individual nationalistic sentiments.
Individual nationalistic sentiments are then averaged to the city level. Figure
1 shows the geographic distribution of nationalistic sentiments across 239 cities.
Blank spaces (white areas) in the map refer to cities where fewer than ten
individuals took the test. Most cities in our sample are located on the east side
of Hu’s line, a demarcation that divides China into two halves by population
density. The east side of Hu’s line accounts for 25.2% of China’s territory
and 79.1% of its population.15 Figure 1 delivers two clear messages: first,
nationalistic sentiments have a large within-province variation;16 and second,
coastal provinces do not show less nationalistic sentiments.
We next match city-level nationalistic sentiments with various city character-
istics, obtained from the China City Statistical Yearbook 2009 (National Bureau
of Statistics in China, henceforth, NBSC, 2009a) and the China Province Statis-
tical Yearbook 2009 (NBSC, 2009b). These city characteristics, such as GDP per
capita, share of rural population, and gender ratio, describe economic environ-
ments in which test participants reside. In particular, they proxy for individual
characteristics such as income, job type and gender, the absence of which causes
a limitation of the Zuobiao data. The other remedy we use to overcome the ab-
sence of individual characteristics is to employ the WVS data, which report
individual-level information, as we discuss in section 4.2. Descriptive statistics
of the variables are reported in Table A2.
14We will use a two-point scale in robustness checks; see section 4.
15See http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12285649.
16Province borders in Figure 1 are gray.
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3.2 Sample selection
The Zuobiao test does not represent a random sample of China’s general pop-
ulace because the majority of China’s citizens have no access to the internet.
We consider the sample selection caused by internet access as a strength of the
data. Given China’s sizable population and communist political regime, there
does not exist a database of individuals who represent the national population
and are meanwhile willing to truthfully disclose their political attitudes. Thus,
a sample with known and relatively homogeneous demographics is more infor-
mative than alternative data sources that cover the general public, such as the
WVS. Internet users in China are documented to be young and educated, and
this group constitutes the present and future middle class.17 A comparison be-
tween Chinese internet users and the general population is presented in Table
A3.
A natural question that follows is whether participants in the Zuobiao test
represent a random sample of Chinese internet users. An ideal test is to compare
the demographics of these visitors with that of all internet users; however, the
absence of individual characteristics in the Zuobiao test discussed earlier pre-
vents us from conducting such a test. We instead examine whether nationalistic
sentiments vary by internet accessibility and test participation. Specifically, at
the city level, we compute two ratios, (1) number of internet accounts to popu-
lation and (2) number of test participants to the number of internet accounts,
and then regress nationalistic sentiments on these two ratios. The regression
using ratio (1) illustrates whether internet access is associated with nationalis-
tic sentiments. If so, sample selection becomes an important concern because
nationalistic sentiments may have been either muted or exaggerated by the lack
of internet access. The regression using ratio (2) aims to examine whether the
Zuobiao test particularly attracts individuals with extremely strong or weak
nationalistic sentiments.
The results are reported in Table 2. Columns 1–2 show that, with city char-
acteristics held constant, there is no correlation between internet accessibility
and nationalistic sentiments. As expected, internet accessibility is positively
correlated with local GDP per capita and negatively correlated with the share
of rural population, the latter of which is due to the relatively undeveloped
state of China’s rural areas in terms of infrastructure and education.18 Like-
17See, e.g., Easterly (2001) and Banerjee and Duflo (2008) for discussions on the importance
of the middle class in maintaining political stability and improving policy making.
18See Naughton (2007, Chapter 5) for a discussion on the underdeveloped rural areas in
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wise, columns 3–4 demonstrate the absence of correlation between the incidence
of participating in the Zuobiao test and nationalistic sentiments, such that the
responses collected by Zuobiao are unlikely to represent extreme political at-
titudes. The incidence of participation appears to be lower among the rural
population, possibly due to the same issues with development. In columns 3–4,
local GDP per capita loses the significance it has in columns 1–2, indicating that
test participation, unlike internet accessibility, does not result from better or
worse local economic performance. Since economic performance is an important
local characteristic, this finding substantially mitigates the concern over sample
selection.
The regressions in Table 2 are not a determinant screening test for sample
selection, though we believe sample selection does not drive the results for three
reasons. First, as shown in Table 2, our sample does not show selection toward
or against nationalistic sentiments, in either internet accessibility or test par-
ticipation. Second, the association between trade and nationalistic sentiments
relies on the variation in nationalistic sentiments rather than the average level of
nationalistic sentiments. Third, non-randomness of the sample does not bias our
results in a certain direction and therefore does not threaten our identification.
For instance, taking the Zuobiao test may result from political consciousness,
which does not necessarily mute or exaggerate nationalistic sentiments.19
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Baseline results
We start with Hypotheses I and II on page 10 using the regression
NATION c = βEXc + γIM c + ζ¯ ′Xc + εc, (11)
where c is the city index, NATION is the city-level measure of nationalis-
tic sentiments constructed in section 3.1. EX (IM) is the exports/GDP (im-
ports/GDP) ratio as defined in the theoretical model, Xc includes a set of city
characteristics, and ε is the error term. The city characteristics include GDP
per capita, gender ratio, share of rural population, share of college students,
share of government budget in GDP, travel intensity, and labor intensity in
China.
19Also, their attitudes are arguably more important than the general public, because they
are more politically influential than others.
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production.20
Hypothesis I says that if NATION is regressed on EX (IM) alone, the co-
efficient βˆ (γˆ) will be negative. The results are reported in Table 3.21 Column
1 includes only EX, whose coefficient is negative and statistically significant.
Column 3 includes only IM , whose coefficient is also negative and statistically
significant. Both columns have controlled for Xc and are consistent with Hy-
pothesis I. Hypothesis II says that if NATION is regressed on both EX and
IM , then βˆ < 0, γˆ = 0, which is supported by column 5, where βˆ < 0 remains
statistically significant but γˆ is not significantly different from zero. Quantita-
tively, a one standard deviation increase in EX is associated with a decrease in
nationalistic sentiments by approximately 0.23 standard deviations (column 5,
-0.113×0.250/0.121'-0.233).22
A test participant may view foreign countries negatively because she holds
protectionist attitudes. To address this concern, columns 2, 4, and 6 in Table
3 include protectionist attitudes (in favor of high tariff and high barrier to in-
ward FDI).23 They reach the same findings as columns 1, 3, and 5; meanwhile,
protectionist attitudes slightly reduce the coefficient of EX, indicating that pro-
tectionist attitudes may indeed explain some of the negative views about foreign
countries. Now, a one standard deviation increase in EX is associated with a
decrease in nationalistic sentiments by approximately 0.18 standard deviations
(column 6, -0.091×0.250/0.121'-0.188). In addition, protectionist attitudes are,
as expected, positively correlated with nationalistic sentiments, a finding that
is consistent with Mayda and Rodrik (2005) and O’Rourke and Sinnott (2001).
Nationalistic sentiments show little variation with city characteristics other than
EX and IM .24
Two-point scale We also conduct a robustness check that addresses the
trade-off between two scales of responses: the four-point scale used by the Zuo-
biao algorithm or the two-point scale (i.e., (dis)agree and strongly (dis)agree
20Travel intensity is defined as the ratio of number of travelers to total population. Labor
intensity is defined as the ratio of total wages to GDP. If production in a local economy is
approximated by a Cobb-Douglas production function Q = K1−αLLαL , the labor intensity
refers to αL.
21Sample size in regressions is smaller than in Figure 1, because data on trade or other city
characteristics are unavailable for some cities.
22Standard deviations can be found in Table A2.
23Protectionist attitudes are measured by responses to the following two statements: “high
tariffs should be imposed on foreign counterparts of domestic products, in order to protect
national industries” and “foreign capital in China should be restricted from developing at
(their) will.” The same scale and averaging method are used as in section 3.1.
24Not reported due to space limitation; available upon request.
15
both considered as (dis)agree). On the one hand, the two-point scale could in-
cur a loss of information, because “strongly (dis)agree” reflects a sharper stance;
on the other hand, it is unclear whether the numeric difference captured by the
four-point scale (e.g., strongly disagree=4 points, disagree=3 points) has a car-
dinal meaning.25 As a compromise, we use the four-point scale in Table 3 and
the two-point scale in Table 4 as a robustness check. Table 4 presents the same
findings as Table 3 in both signs and significance levels of coefficients. As ex-
pected, the coefficient magnitudes of EX and IM in Table 4 are smaller, since
the two-point scale is a more conservative measure of attitudes.
Ideological heterogeneity Apart from protectionist attitudes, heterogeneity
in other political ideologies may be confounded with nationalistic sentiments.
To address this, we undertake two empirical exercises. The first is to use trade
to explain a set of values potentially related to nationalistic sentiments:26
(Conservatism) “Robbing from the rich and giving to the poor” is a
heroic deed.
(Tradition) Chinese traditional medicine exceeds mainstream West-
ern medicine in a number of ways.
(Tradition) “Feng-shui” (Chinese astrology) is a great achievement of
our forefathers’ wisdom and can explain a wide range of phenomena.
(Criticism on reforms) The fruits of China’s recent economic reforms
have been grabbed by a few people; the majority hardly received any
benefits.
(Criticism on reforms) Frustratingly, economists are becoming spokesper-
sons of the rich.
If responses to these statements do not vary with exports, our previous findings
are further supported, because these values are not heterogeneous across cities
in a way that is related to trade. Table 5 reports the results. Exports are
shown to have no significant association with any of these variables, while cities
with more imports appear to have fewer believers in “feng-shui” (column 2),
possibly because “feng-shui” has to compete against its counterpart in other
cultures such as the Western astrology.27 Protectionist attitudes are positively
25Since regressions are run at the city level, neither ordered probit nor logit can solve the
problem.
26Labels in parentheses are added by the authors.
27With education already controlled for, this is not likely due to heterogeneity in education.
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correlated with the trust in Chinese traditional medicine (column 3), as well as
the distrust in economists (column 5). The latter is possibly because economists
are usually proponents of free trade and FDI.
Next, we exploit the variation in nationalistic sentiments that cannot be
fitted by a linear combination of these values. Specifically, we run an individual-
level regression,
NATIONic = ι¯′Zic + νic,
where Zic is a vector consisting of individual i’s responses to the statements
above. The residual νˆic is then averaged to the city level:
˜NATION c = 1
nc
∑
i∈c
νˆic,
where nc is the number of respondents in city c. This procedure removes com-
ponents in NATION that vary with value heterogeneity potentially related to
nationalistic sentiments. We then use ˜NATION as the dependent variable and
rerun regression (11). The results, reported in Table 6, support previous find-
ings (columns 5–6 in Table 3). In particular, as before, protectionist attitudes
reduce the magnitude of the coefficient of EX.
Net exports We then move on to test Hypothesis III, which subtracts IM
from EX to remove the variation in EX induced by trade cost and keeps the
variation induced by comparative advantage.28 Another merit of using EX −
IM is its similarity with the definition of trade balance in economic statistics:
since GDP must be positive, a trade surplus (deficit) is by definition equivalent
to EXj − IMj > 0 (< 0). The results are reported in Table 7, where the
coefficient of EX − IM is negative and statistically significant, lending support
to Hypothesis III. We have experimented as before with and without control
variables, and in addition cities with trade surpluses and deficits; they all lead
to the same finding. Notably, only 41 out of 218 cities (less than 20%) have
trade deficits. Next, we define an indicator that equals 1 if a city has a “large”
trade surplus, with “large” alternately defined as the top 75%, top 50%, and
top 25% values of EX − IM , and then rerun the regressions in Table 7 using
this indicator instead of EX − IM . The results are reported in Table 8. As the
trade surplus rises, the indicator’s coefficient rises from insignificant in column 1
28The reason for not using EX/IM has been discussed in footnote 11. EX/IM has mean
5.69, standard deviation 13.35, and range [0, 100.0]. In comparison, EX − IM has the mean
0.007, standard deviation 0.02, and range [-0.15, 0.12].
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to strongly negative and significant in column 3. This corroborates the negative
association between nationalistic sentiments and common interests shared with
foreign countries through exports.
4.2 Two additional robustness checks
Business climate We next examine the possibility that nationalistic senti-
ments reduce exports. For instance, foreign importers may prefer to undertake
business travel to cities with less nationalistic sentiments. Although our paper
does not claim the association between exports and nationalistic sentiments to
be causal, we address this reverse causality because, if it is the case, exports
would become merely another measure of nationalistic sentiments. We inves-
tigate the relationship between nationalistic sentiments and forthcoming FDI,
since foreign investors are more sensitive to local business climate than foreign
importers. If the forthcoming FDI does not vary with nationalistic sentiments,
it is then reasonable to assume that local nationalistic sentiments do not re-
duce exports. The forthcoming FDI is measured with “newly contracted FDI”
(ncFDI), meaning FDI that has been signed into contracts but not yet made.
Since those foreign-invested firms have not yet been established, they do not
affect nationalistic sentiments.
We use the specification
ncFDIc = δNATIONc + ηOPENNESSc + θ′Xc + εc (12)
where ncFDIc is measured using either value or number of contracts,29 OPENNESSc
is defined to be (exports+imports)/GDP as in the literature,30 and Xc is a
vector of city characteristics as before. The results are reported in Table
9. Neither the invested value (columns 1–2) nor the number of FDI con-
tracts (columns 3–4) varies with nationalistic sentiments, with or without con-
trolling for OPENNESS. As expected, FDI is positively correlated with
OPENNESS.
Variation in trade over time In this subsection, we use a different and
unrelated dataset, the World Value Survey (WVS), to rerun our previous re-
sults. The WVS is a cross-country survey coordinated by the Institute of Social
29When measured by value, the value is divided by GDP.
30See, e.g., Alcala and Ciccone (2004), Bolaky and Freund (2004), Chang, Kaltani, and
Loayza (2005), Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004), and Wei (2000). Also see Harrison
and Rodríguez-Clare (2010) for a review on the measure of openness.
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Research of the University of Michigan. It is one of the most widely used data
sources for studies on values in the economics and political science literature.31
A study using the WVS data complements our previous study in two ways.
First, the recent two waves of WVS, complete in 2001 and 2007, happened
to occur before and after China’s accession to the World Trade Organization
(WTO) in December 2001. China’s trade rose substantially during this time
period and thus provides a quasi-exogenous variation in trade over time. Sec-
ond, the WVS reports demographic information on individuals, which is absent
in the Zuobiao data in order to ensure privacy protection.
At the same time, the WVS dataset has two crucial drawbacks. The first
involves over-aggregation and the small number of provinces. The WVS dataset
reports province- rather than city-level resident locations. Mainland China has
32 province-level administrative divisions (henceforth, province),32 and in 2001
and 2007 WVS sampled only 24 of these divisions.33 Second, the WVS dataset
does not target internet users. To make the WVS sample comparable to the
Zuobiao sample, we drop all individuals over 50 years old at the time of the
survey. Our final sample includes 1,907 individuals from 21 provinces. Table
A4 lists the three questions that we use to construct an individual-level index of
nationalistic sentiments, which ranges from 1 (weak) to 3 (strong). The mean
of the index is 2.1 out of 3 (s.d.=0.46), a value which is very similar to the index
we compile using the Zuobiao data (2.8 out of 4, s.d.=0.6434). The majority of
individuals in the sample are middle aged (28-45) and married, have a medium
level of education and income, and have at least one child.35
We use the WVS data to exploit the variation in province-level foreign trade
between 2001 and 2007, with province fixed effect included. Figure 2 plots
province-level EX and IM between 1990 and 2010. Evidently, both China’s
exports and imports skyrocketed right after the WTO accession and continued
to rise until 2007. The regression is specified as
31For instance, in economics, Alesina and Angeletos (2005) on beliefs in fairness, Guiso,
Sapienza, and Zingales (2003) on attitudes conducive to economic growth, Knack and Keefer
(1997) on social capital; in political science, Inglehart and Welzel (2005) on modernization.
32The 32 province-level administrative divisions include 23 provinces, 4 municipalities, and
5 autonomous regions. The two WVS waves we examine surveyed approximately 3,000 indi-
viduals in mainland China. We include only individuals who resided in provinces that were
covered in both waves.
33In total, the WVS has conducted four waves in China: 1990, 1995, 2001, and 2007. The
1995 wave provides no information on locations of respondents, while the 1990 wave surveyed
only 11 provinces and used a very different questionnaire from other waves.
34These are moments of the individual-level index, not the city-level index summarized in
Table A2.
35The survey measures education and income by categorical variables, from low to high.
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NATIONipt = piEXpt +$IMpt + ρ¯′Xipt + ςp + ipt, (13)
where NATIONipt is the level of nationalistic sentiments reported by individual
i in province p at year t. EXpt and IMpt are defined as before but now at the
province level, Xipt is a set of demographic characteristics, including gender,
age, educational attainment, income, marriage status, and whether they had
children or not. ςp is a province fixed effect.
Results from regression (13) are reported in Table 10, which are consistent
with those reported in Table 3. Specifically, EX is negative and significant,
either alone or together with IM (columns 1 and 3). The coefficient of IM is
negative but not significant (column 2, coefficient=-0.588, s.e.=0.378), which
is different from columns 3–4 in Table 3, where IM ’s coefficient is significant
when IM is included alone in the regression. This difference is highly consistent
with our theory. Recall that IM is only determined by trade cost (broadly
defined) according to our theory, and regression (13) has included a province
fixed effect; therefore, the province fixed effect absorbs the time-invariant trade
cost. Again, when both EX and IM are included in the regression, only EX
is statistically significant (column 3, coefficient=0.253, s.e.=0.413), indicating
that comparative advantage in the form of prices has changed in respond to
reductions in foreign tariff changes. A one standard deviation increase in EX
is associated with a decrease in nationalistic sentiments by approximately 0.4
standard deviations (the counterpart in Table 3 is approximately 0.2 standard
deviations).36 Column 4 uses net exports, EX−IM , as the explanatory variable
and reaches the same conclusion as before.
It should be noted that nationalistic sentiments appear to vary little with
most demographic characteristics. Women have less nationalistic sentiments
than men, and income is positively associated with nationalistic sentiments, but
these coefficients are quantitatively small. This largely mitigates the concern
over the absence of individual demographic information in the previous analysis
of the Zuobiao data. In summary, by using a separate data source as well as
variation in a different dimension, we reach the same conclusion as in Table 3
that nationalistic sentiments are negatively associated with exports.
36The standard deviation is 0.228 for EX and 0.458 forNATION . A one standard deviation
increase in EX is related with a 0.4 standard deviations decrease (-0.787×0.228/0.458)=-
0.391) in nationalistic sentiments.
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5 Conclusions
Both the political and economic aspects of trade have been widely discussed,
but nationalistic sentiments have been believed to be merely political phenom-
ena. Our paper shows, however, that nationalistic sentiments have economic
interests behind them. Within a country, nationalistic sentiments are stronger
in regions whose production places more weights on the domestic market. Here
is a thought experiment that can illustrate the intuition. Other things being
equal, nationalistic sentiments are the strongest where local production serves
only the domestic market. Those sentiments are presented as advocating the
supremacy of the national interests, xenophobia, sovereignty and territorial in-
tegrity, and militarism. To locals in this scenario, the home country is the entire
market, and foreign countries do not matter as long as they do not harm the
home. Clearly, accessing the foreign market will dilute these sentiments. The
more important the foreign market, the weaker nationalistic sentiments are in
a regional economy.
This theoretical prediction is supported by our study on city-level data from
China. Our empirical results show that nationalistic sentiments are weaker in
cities where exports are more important to the local economy. To ascertain
that this association is indeed between nationalistic sentiments and exports, we
have shown that the association is not driven by city characteristics (e.g., demo-
graphics), protectionist attitudes, heterogeneous political ideologies, hostility to
foreign commerce, nor are the findings specific to our dataset. Our findings sug-
gest a number of avenues for future research. Empirical advancement will result
from finding scenarios where trade is randomly assigned to identify the causal-
ity, though such scenarios are rare. More promising is theoretical advancement
that results from modeling the role of nationalistic sentiments in political econ-
omy based on its link with foreign markets. For example, future research could
address how federal and regional politicians deal with nationalistic sentiments
in the context of wars and trade policies.
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Table 1: Correlation Matrix of Responses to Nationalistic Statements 
 This table presents the correlation matrix between individual responses to four statements of nationalistic sentiments. See text (section 3) for details. N1 is "Given sufficient comprehensive national power, China has the right to take any measure to protect its interests." N2 is "Western countries, headed by the United States, will not really allow China to become a world-class strong nation." N3 is "State unity and territorial integrity are the interests of paramount priority for a society." N4 is "All students, regardless in college, high school, or elementary school, should attend the military training arranged by the government."   N1 N2 N3 N2 0.299   N3 0.339 0.384  N4 0.237 0.288 0.392          
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Internet Access, Test Participation, and Nationalistic Sentiments 
 This table examines the correlation between Ratios (1) and (2) (defined in the first row) and nationalistic sentiments. See text (section 3) for details. Constant term not reported. ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   Dependent variable: Ratio (1): No. of internet accounts to Population Ratio (2): No. of participants to No. of internet accounts  1 2 3 4 Nationalistic sentiments -0.126** (0.059) -0.073 (0.045) 0.102 (0.298) 0.183 (0.292) Log (GDP per capita)  0.069*** (.011)  0.017 (0.071) Share of Rural Population  -0.160*** (0.029)  -0.502*** (0.184) Observations 239 239 239 239 R-Square 0.019 0.428 0.001 0.051          
  
 
 
Table 3: Nationalistic Sentiments and Trade (Baseline Results) 
 This table examines the association between nationalistic sentiments and trade (exports and imports weighted by GDP, i.e., EX and IM, respectively). See text (section 4) for details. Control variables are GDP per capita, gender ratio, share of rural population, share of college students, share of government budget in GDP, travel intensity, and labor intensity in production. Constant term not reported. Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. Clustering is at the province level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.         
Dependent variable is nationalistic sentiments (four-point scale).  1 2 3 4 5 6 EX -0.104*** -0.093**   -0.113** -0.091**  (0.029) (0.036)   (0.043) (0.042) IM   -0.073* -0.075* 0.014 -0.004    (0.039) (0.043) (0.059) (0.054) Protectionism on tariff  0.140*  0.137*  0.140*   (0.074)  (0.078)  (0.075) Protectionism on FDI  0.354***  0.362***  0.354***   (0.080)  (0.078)  (0.080) Observations 218 218 218 218 218 218 R-squared 0.06 0.27 0.04 0.26 0.06 0.27 
 
 
   
Table 4: Nationalistic Sentiments and Trade (Two-point Scale)  This table examines the association between nationalistic sentiments and trade (exports and imports weighted by GDP, i.e., EX and IM, respectively). Different from Table 3, dependent variables are binary in this table. See text (section 4) for details. Control variables are GDP per capita, gender ratio, share of rural population, share of college students, share of government budget in GDP, travel intensity, and labor intensity in production. Constant term not reported. Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. Clustering is at the province level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Dependent variable is nationalistic sentiments (two-point scale)  
 
1 2 3 4 EX -0.047***  -0.052** -0.042**  (0.013)  (0.019) (0.019) IM  -0.032** 0.008 -0.002   (0.015) (0.024) (0.022) Protectionism on tariff    0.024     (0.039) Protectionism on FDI    0.166***     (0.034) Observations 218 218 218 218 R-squared 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.23   
 
  
 
 
Table 5: Heterogeneous Political Ideologies and Trade  This table examines whether the results in Table 3 also hold for other political ideologies. The main explanatory variables remain exports and imports (EX and IM, respectively) weighted by GDP. See text (section 4) for details. Control variables are GDP per capita, gender ratio, share of rural population, share of college students, share of government budget in GDP, travel intensity, and labor intensity in production. Constant term not reported. Clustering is at the province level. * significant at 10%; *** significant at 1%.  Dependent variable in columns 1—5 are, respectively, four-point scale responses (city-level averages) to the following statements: (1) "'Robbing from the rich and giving to the poor' is a heroic deed;" (2) "Chinese traditional medicine exceeds mainstream western medicine in a number of ways;" (3) “Feng-shui” (Chinese astrology) is a great achievement of our forefathers’ wisdom and can explain a wide range of phenomena;" (4) "The fruits of China's recent economic reforms have been grabbed by a few people; the majority hardly received any benefits;" and (5) "Frustratingly, economists are becoming spokespersons of the rich." 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 Dependent variable Rob the rich Feng-shui Chinese medicine China reform Distrust in Economists EX -0.045 0.047 0.045 0.031 0.032  (0.058) (0.031) (0.047) (0.030) (0.031) IM -0.014 -0.063* -0.044 -0.029 0.033  (0.061) (0.033) (0.047) (0.054) (0.031) Protectionism on tariff 0.073 -0.099 -0.017 0.106 0.135*  (0.071) (0.095) (0.089) (0.073) (0.073) Protectionism on FDI 0.113 0.125 0.293*** -0.079 0.167*** 
  (0.086) (0.098) (0.068) (0.103) (0.056) Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Observations 218 218 218 218 218 R-squared 0.06 0.04 0.11 0.05 0.11     
 
 
  
Table 6: Residual Regressions 
 This table examines the association between trade and nationalistic sentiments that cannot be explained by ideological heterogeneity. See text (section 4) for details. Control variables GDP per capita, gender ratio, share of rural population, share of college students, share of government budget in GDP, travel intensity, and labor intensity in production. Constant Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. Clustering is at the province level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
  1 2 EX -0.116*** -0.101**  (0.040) (0.039) IM 0.013 0.003  (0.060) (0.056) Protectionism on tariff  0.129*   (0.071) Protectionism on FDI  0.231***   (0.077) Control variables: Yes Yes Observations 218 218 R-squared 0.07 0.20      
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Nationalistic Sentiments and Net Exports I  This table examines the association between nationalistic sentiments and net exports (measured by exports less imports weighted by GDP, i.e., EX-IM). See text (section 4) for details. Control variables are GDP per capita, gender ratio, share of rural population, share of college students, share of government budget in GDP, travel intensity, and labor intensity in production. Constant term not reported. Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. Clustering is at the province level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Dependent variable is nationalistic sentiments (NATION). 
 
1 2 3 4 Sample (trade balance): Surplus Surplus Deficit Deficit EX-IM -1.204*** -1.120** -1.442** -0.909*  (0.376) (0.480) (0.502) (0.496) Protectionism on tariff  0.159**  -0.116   (0.076)  (0.189) Protectionism on FDI  0.340***  0.254***   (0.095)  (0.068) Observations 177 177 41 41 R-squared 0.07 0.27 0.33 0.41          
  
 
 
 
 
  
Table 8: Nationalistic Sentiments and Net Exports II  This table examines the association between nationalistic sentiments and net exports. Net exports is measured by an indicator of large trade surplus weighted by GDP (i.e., EX-IM). Large trade surplus is alternately defined as top 75%, 50% and 25% of EX-IM values in columns 1, 2, 3. Less than 20% of cities hold trade deficits such that that the indicator must correspond to trade surplus. See text (section 4) for details. Control variables are GDP per capita, gender ratio, share of rural population, share of college students, share of government budget in GDP, travel intensity, and labor intensity in production. Constant term not reported. Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. Clustering is at the province level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.     Dependent variable is nationalistic sentiments (NATION).  1 2 3  Top 75% Top 50% Top 25% Indicator of large Trade surplus -0.021 -0.029* -0.047**  (0.018) (0.014) (0.018) Protectionism on tariff 0.143* 0.153* 0.143*  (0.078) (0.076) (0.073) Protectionism on FDI 0.353*** 0.344*** 0.358***  (0.080) (0.079) (0.077) Observations 218 218 218 R-squared 0.25 0.26 0.27 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9: Nationalistic Sentiments and Forthcoming FDI   This table examines the association between forthcoming FDI and nationalistic sentiments. See text (section 4) for details. Control variables are GDP per capita, gender ratio, share of rural population, share of college students, share of government budget in GDP, travel intensity, and labor intensity in production. Constant term not reported. Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. Clustering is at the province level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
  1 2 3 4 Dependent variable FDI/GDP FDI/GDP Log(#FDI) Log(#FDI) NATION -0.011 -0.005 -1.298 -0.760 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.882) (0.767) OPENNESS  0.015***  1.328***   (0.003)  (0.255) Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Observations 214 214 211 211 R-squared 0.318 0.369 0.330 0.411           
 
 
Table 10: Results from the WVS Data (with Province Fixed Effects and Individual Characteristics)  This table examines the association between nationalistic sentiments and trade (exports and imports weighted by GDP, i.e., EX and IM, respectively). See text (section 4) for details. The data are from the World Value Survey (WVS). All regressions control for the province fixed effect. Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. Clustering is at the province level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Dependent variable is nationalistic sentiments (NATION). 
  1 2 3 4 EX -0.617***  -0.787** -0.868***  (0.204)  (0.287) (0.264) IM  -0.588 0.253    (0.378) (0.413)  Age 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) Gender -0.064* -0.066* -0.063* -0.063* 
 (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) Income 0.027*** 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.031*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) Education 0.022 0.020 0.022 0.022 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) Married -0.063 -0.060 -0.065 -0.073 
 (0.067) (0.066) (0.066) (0.064) Child 0.057 0.053 0.059 0.067 
 (0.063) (0.062) (0.061) (0.062) Constant 1.910*** 2.315*** 1.696*** 1.037*** 
 (0.121) (0.422) (0.399) (0.228) Observations 1,330 1,330 1,330 1,330 R-squared 0.096 0.093 0.096 0.093 
           
 
 
Figure 1: Map of China’s Nationalistic Sentiments 
  Notes: Only mainland China is included in this study. The black straight line in the map is the Hu's Line. See text (section 3) for details.   
 
 
    
Figure 2: China's WTO Accession and the Share of Trade in GDP 
 
 
 
  
WTO Membership
15
20
25
30
35
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
of
 G
D
P
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Year
Exports Imports
 
 
 
Appendix A1: Sample Report and Statistics from Zuobiao  Your Results: Regime Coordinate: 0.1; Cultural Coordinate: -0.4; Economic Coordinate: 0.1  All coordinates are within range [-2,2].  Regime Coordinate: authoritarianism vs. libertarianism, positive value refers to libertarianism. Cultural Coordinate: conservatism vs. liberalism, positive value refers to liberalism. Economic Coordinate: collectivism vs. neoliberalism, positive value refers to neoliberalism.   Notes: The sample report indicates that this participant holds political opinions towards libertarianism (slightly), conservatism (moderately), and neoliberalism (slightly). Zuobiao also publishes the following histograms to facilitate self-evaluation:  Regime Economics Culture 
                  
 
 
Table A2: Descriptive Statistics   Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Index of nationalistic sentiments (NATION), 4-point scale 239 2.903 0.121 2.450 3.219 Index of nationalistic sentiments (NATION), 2-point scale  239 0.682 0.056 0.488 0.833 GDP per capita*  239 9.996 0.611 8.549 11.579 Export/GDP (EX) 226 0.155 0.250 0 1.611 Import/GDP (IM) 226 0.104 0.215 0 1.811 Share of rural population 239 0.668      0.236 0 0.956 Gender ratio (female=100) 231 104.96 3.785 93.33 121 Share of college students (per 10,000 people) 239 0.016 0.021 0 0.116 Share of government budget in GDP 239 0.060 0.027 0.024 0.238 Travel intensity 239 0.002 0.003 0.0004 0.032 * Currency unit is yuan (RMB). In 2009, the average exchange rate was $1=6.841 yuan.        
 
  
 
 
Table A3: Profiles of Chinese Internet Users and Citizens (2010) 
  Internet Users  Citizens Population(million) 384 1335 Gender Ratio (female=100) 118.3 105.9 Urban Residents (%) 72.2 46.6 Age Distribution (%) Age 10-19 31.8 13.5 Age 20-29 28.6 14 Age 30-39 21.5 15.9 Age 40-49 10.7 17.8 Education Distribution (%) Elementary school and below 8.8 37.2 Middle school 26.8 41.7 High school 40.2 13.8 College and above 24.3 7.3 Source: Data on internet users are from the Statistical Survey Report on Internet Development in China (China Internet Network Information Center, 2010). The data on citizens are from the China Statistical Yearbook 2010 (NBSC, 2010).          
  
 
 
    
Table A4: The WVS Survey Questions on Nationalistic Sentiments Questions Values       What is the most important goal of the country?  1. A high level of economic growth 2. Strong defense forces 3. People have more say about how things are done 4. Trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful. 
 Strong defense forces is the first choice =3 Strong defense forces is the second choice =2 Strong defense forces is neither first nor the second choice =1    How much confidence you have in armed forces? A great deal=3 Quite a lot=2 Not very much or none at all =1   How proud are you to be a Chinese? Very proud=3 Quite proud =2 Not very or not at all =1 Note: For each individual, we create three variables as listed in the table. Then we calculate simple mean of the three variables as the index of nationalistic sentiments.           
